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It is widely assumed that the School of the Americas (SOA), a US training 
school for Latin American military forces, advocated repression during the 
Cold War.  To demonstrate this, previous research has tended to focus on 
establishing correlations between training and specific human rights abuses by 
individuals trained at SOA.  A stronger case can be made through detailed 
analysis of SOA training manuals within the context of US foreign policy 
WRZDUGVWKHJOREDO6RXWK3XEOLFSURWHVWOHGWR62$¶VUH-launch in 2001.  
Most protestors assume that this change was purely cosmetic.  Based on 
extensive fieldwork, I argue that changes were genuine, and the School now 
has a commendable human rights programme.  This is in contrast to most US 
military training, domestic and foreign, which remains secretive and devoid of 
adequate human rights instruction.  The paper argues that a resurgence of 





It has been widely assumed that the notorious School of the Americas (SOA), a US training 
school for Latin American military personnel, established in the 1940s, waVD³6FKRRORI
$VVDVVLQV´The School was re-launched as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security 
Cooperation (WHINSEC) in 2001, following massive public protest by SOA Watch 
62$:62$:DUJXHWKDWLWFRQWLQXHVWREHD³6FKRRORI$VVDVVLQV´WKDWWKe re-launch 
was purely cosmetic, and that WHINSEC continues to pose a threat to human rights and 
should be closed.   
 
I argue that SOA was engaged in advocating repression during the Cold War, but the 
emphasis in previous research on establishing correlations between incidents of human 
rights abuses and the involvement in them of individuals who have attended SOA, is 
misplaced.3  I argue that a stronger case can be made by referring to US policy towards the 
                                                          
1 I am grateful to everyone from the US Department of Defence and WHINSEC who agreed to be interviewed, 
especially Ken LaPlante, Lee Rials and Tony Raimondo; and various members of SOA Watch, especially Roy 
Bourgeois, Eric LeCompte, Jacqueline Baker, and David Mezzera.  Thanks also to the editors of TWQ, Eric 
Herring, Laura Shepherd, Anna Stavrianakis, Doug Stokes and Stephen Blakeley for comments on earlier drafts 
of this paper.   
3
 J Nelson-Pallmeyer, School of Assassins, New York: Orbis Books, 1997; Second Edition, 2001; K McCoy, 
'Trained to Torture: A Statistical Analysis of Human Rights Violations Committed by Graduates of the US 
Army School of the Americas, 1960-2000', University of Wisconsin, Master of Science Thesis, 2003. 
 2 
global South, which was characterised primarily by support for repression.4   This support 
for repression is evident in training manuals used at SOA that advocated torture and 
murder, and in additional training materials used by US security and intelligence agencies 
during the Cold War.  Previous research has referred to the SOA manuals, but no detailed 
analysis has been undertaken within the context of foreign policy.  I have analysed them in 
conjunction with other security and intelligence materials, and have also interviewed US 
Department of Defence (DoD) personnel who were involved in the training at SOA and 
beyond.5   
 
Since the re-launch, there has been no detailed research to assess WHINSEC.6  Contrary to 
widespread perceptions, I show that positive changes have taken place.  It now has 
commendable human rights training and a high level of accountability.  These findings are 
based on interviews with DoD personnel, and a two-month period of observation and 
interviewing at WHINSEC.  Meanwhile, the majority of US military training, domestic and 
foreign, remains unaccountable and is being offered to countries with poor human rights 
records.  Since 9/11, the US has condoned and used repression, particularly in the treatment 
RI³:DURQ7HUURU´GHWDLQHHV7KHTXHVWLRQRIWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRI86KXPDQULJKWV
training for its own and other troops is very much in the public eye, following the alleged 
massacre of Iraqis by US troops in Haditha.  In early June 2006, US troops were ordered to 
take a crash course in battlefield ethics following revelations about the massacre.7  It is not 
clear what this training will entail and how it is envisaged that it will have positive effects 
on the conduct of US troops.  Throughout the paper, the connections between the training 
and broader patterns in US foreign policy strategy are outlined.  I conclude that while SOA 
and WHINSEC reflected wider strategies prior to 9/11, WHINSEC does not yet reflect the 
most recent shift in US foreign policy strategy, which amounts to a resurgence of support 
for repression.   
 
SOA, counterinsurgency and repression  
 
US strategies for achieving foreign policy objectives during the Cold War in the South 
were predominantly repressive, and justified in terms of containing communism.  However, 
US support for and use of repression throughout the Cold War was as much to do with 
protecting and promoting the interests of US and international capitalist elites as with 
                                                          
4 My interpretation of the terms human rights and repression are drawn from two bodies of international law: 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL).  Human rights are those 
rights which all citizens share under international law, both in peacetime and during armed conflict, and which 
are to be guaranteed by armed actors with regard to IHL, and by the state and armed actors with regard to 
IHRL.  The most fundamental of these are the right to life, the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, prohibition of slavery and servitude and the prohibition of retroactive 
criminal laws.  In addition to these, human rights comprise the prohibition of discrimination on any basis, 
provisions for the protection of women and children, and the regulation of aspects of health and food provision, 
as well as labour.  I define repression as any act which violates these human rights laws.  See ICRC, 
'International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Similarities and Differences', 
International Committee of the Red Cross, 2003, 
<http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57JR8L/$FILE/IHL_and_IHRL.pdf?OpenElement>  
,XVHWKHWHUPV³FRHUFLRQ´DQG³UHSUHVVLRQ´LQWHUFKDQJHDEO\ 
5 Lesley Gill undertook an anthropological study at SOA, and analysed the way in which the training is intended 
to shape the Latin American militaries in accordance with US foreign policy objectives, by focusing on the 
interactions between staff and students at SOA in the late 1990s.  See: L Gill, The School of the Americas.  
Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas, Durham: Duke University Press, 2004, which is the 
only work to date which has involved interviews with those involved with the training. 
6 Amnesty International¶V research on the extent of US training of foreign military personnel included a brief 
section which commented on the improved transparency and introduction of human rights training at 
WHINSEC.  AI, 'Unmatched Power, Unmet Principles: The Human Rights Dimensions of US Training of 
Foreign Military and Police Forces', Amnesty International, 2002, 
<http://www.amnestyusa.org/stoptorture/msp.pdf> 
7
 J Borger, 'US Troops Ordered to Undergo Ethical Training after Killing of Iraqi Civilians', The Guardian, 2 
June 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,329495232-103550,00.html> 
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containing communism.8  The US state supported the use of torture and murder by CIA and 
military personnel in Vietnam under the Phoenix Programme, and backed coups and 
repression by authoritarian governments, in which many thousands of civilians have been 
killed.9  During the Cold War Counterinsurgency (CI) strategies dominated US military 
training, which advocated operations to undermine supposed guerrilla activity, to the 
detriment of human rights.10  The charge that the training has contributed to repression has 
most frequently been levelled against SOA, responsible for training 61,000 Latin 
Americans between 1946 and 2000.  SOAW argue that the training has resulted in 
systematic repression by SOA graduates.  62$¶VPLVVLRQVWDWHPHQWindicates the 
centrality of CI to its curriculum: 
(YHU\FRXUVHWDXJKWKDVGHILQLWHDSSOLFDWLRQLQWKH&,ILHOG>«@&XUUHQWO\WKH
Department provides instruction in every aspect of CI operations, be it 
military, paramilitary, political, sociological or psychological.11 
Whilst there is compelling evidence that some SOA graduates were involved in repression, 
and that the training encouraged this, previous research has not established the relationship 
between the training and repression as thoroughly as possible. Researchers have tried to 
prove that the training caused specific individuals to commit acts of repression.12   Whilst 
this is plausible, their findings revolve around a handful of cases in which allegations have 
been made against individuals who, at some point in the past 50 years, received SOA 
training.  Allegations have been made against less than 1.5 percent of SOA attendees and of 
those, only nine individuals have actually been found guilty.  Of these nine, three were 
sentenced by Peruvian military courts, and three by civil courts in Argentina, El Salvador 
and Panama.  One Guatemalan was sentenced by a US court, and it is not clear what type of 
court sentenced the other two, from Peru.13  In a climate of impunity, it is amazing that any 
allegations were made at all, and that anyone was found guilty.  In such a climate, people 
are unlikely to report repression out of fear of reprisals.  The incidence of acts of repression 
committed was probably far higher than previous research suggests.  There are more 
appropriate ways of establishing the relationships between the training and repression, and 
this involves assessing the nature of the training within the broader context of US foreign 
policy.    
 
Spanish language manuals: advocating repression 
 
The US military has been complicit in repression through the use of training materials 
which advocated human rights violations.  These were distributed among SOA students and 
US Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) for use among Latin American soldiers, and were 
consistent with materials used by US military and intelligence services during the Cold 
War.  In March 1992, the US Assistant to the Secretary of Defence for Intelligence 
                                                          
8 W Blum, Killing Hope.  US Military and CIA interventions since World War II, London: Zed Books, 2003, 
pp.7-20; N Chomsky and E Herman, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism: The Political 
Economy of Human Rights, vol I, Boston: South End Press, 1979, pp.1-40; E Herman, The Real Terror 
Network, Second Edition, Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1985, pp.1-8; G Kolko, Confronting the Third World.  
United States Foreign Policy 1945-1980, New York: Pantheon Books, 1988, pp.3-16; D Stokes, America's 
Other War, London: Zed Books, 2005, pp.18-34; 'Why the End of the Cold War Doesn't Matter: the US War of 
Terror in Colombia', Review of International Studies, 29(4), 2003, pp.560-585.  
9 On the Phoenix Programme see D Valentine, The Phoenix Program, Second Edition, Lincoln: Authors Guild 
BackinPrint.Com, 2000.  On US involvement via the CIA in coups and repression see Chomsky, and Herman, 
The Washington Connection; Kolko, Confronting the Third World; Blum, Killing Hope.   
10 For analysis of counterinsurgency as a US foreign policy tool see M McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft, 
New York: Pantheon Books, 1992.  
11 US Department of Defence, USARCARIB School Supplemental Course Catalogue, 1962, pp.5-7.  Cited in J 
Leuer, 'A Half Century of Professionalism: The US Army School of the Americas', Adelante, Historical 
Edition, 2000, p.13.  
12 Nelson-Pallmeyer, School of Assassins; School of Assassins: Guns, Greed and Globalisation, Second Edition; 
and McCoy,  Trained to Torture.     
13
 SOAW, 'Notorious Graduates (By Country)', School of Americas Watch, 2004, <http://www.soaw.org> 
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Oversight (ASDIO) presented a report to the Secretary concerning seven Spanish language 
manuals that were used as part of intelligence training in Latin America and at SOA 
between 1987 and 1991.14  7KH$6',2UHSRUWFRQFOXGHGWKDWVL[RIWKHPDQXDOV³FRQWDLQ
about two dozen passages of objectionable and questionable material and that they were 
prepared ZLWKRXWWKHUHTXLUHGGRFWULQDODSSURYDO´15  They were released following 
immense Congressional and public pressure in 1996, along with a press release stating, 
³Two dozen short passages in six of the manuals, which total 1169 pages, contained 
PDWHULDOWKDWHLWKHUZDVQRWRUFRXOGEHLQWHUSUHWHGQRWWREHFRQVLVWHQWZLWK86SROLF\´16  
These manuals were not an anomaly, but were consistent with CI doctrine that had been 
circulating since the 1960s among US military and intelligence agencies.17  A CIA manual, 
Interrogation, produced in 1983 using material from the training notes for a CIA course for 
the Honduran Battalion 316, and from a 1963 manual entitled KUBARK, had been written 
for use by CIA agents against communist subversion.  A further CIA manual, 
Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, which instructed Nicaraguan rebels in 
political assassination and guerrilla warfare, was leaked to the House Intelligence 
Committee in 1984. 18  A CIA manual entitled Human Resource Exploitation also contains 
material which advocates torture during interrogation.19  
 
$FFRUGLQJWR.HQ/D3ODQWH:+,16(&¶VOLDLVRQWRWKH$UP\XQWLORQO\IRXURIWKH
seven manuals cited in the ASDIO report were distributed to SOA students.20  These were 
Handling Sources, Counterintelligence, Combat Intelligence and Analysis I.  LaPlante 
insisted that they were only issued to those on the Military Training course, offered twice 
between 1989 and 1991, as additional readings.  This amounted to 50 students in total, and 
he said it could be safely assumed that another 25, primarily faculty members, also took 
these materials.21  These and the remaining manuals, were, however, used among MTTs, 
and it is unclear how many more individuals received them.  An investigation in 1997 by 
the Inspector General concluded that retrieval of all the manuals was unlikely to be 
possible.22  5HVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHPDQXDOV¶FRPSLODWLRQDQGXVHKDVQRWEHHQDWWULEXWHGWR
any particular US officials.   
 
Various passages within the manuals advocate the violation of Article 4 of Protocol II 
additional to the Geneva Conventions, (henceforth, Article 4) which states: 
All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in 
hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to 
respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious practices. They 
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse 
distinction. It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors.  Without 
prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against the 
persons referred to in paragraph I are and shall remain prohibited at any time 
and in any place whatsoever: (a) violence to the life, health and physical or 
                                                          
14 L Haugaard, 'Declassified Army and Central Intelligence Agency Manuals Used in Latin America: An 
Analysis of their Content', Latin American Working Group, 1997, 
<http://www.lawg.org/pages/new%20pages/Misc/Publications-manuals.htm> 
15 US Department of Defence, 'Fact Sheet Concerning Training Manuals Containing Materials Inconsistent With 
United States Policy', Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence, US Department of Defence, 1992, 
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/archive/news/dodmans.htm> 
16 Haugaard, 'Declassified Army and Central Intelligence Agency Manuals'.   
17 Interviews with DoD personnel between June and September 2004 enabled me to trace the development of 
the Spanish language materials.   
18 J Kennedy, Report on the School of the Americas, Washington DC: National Security Archives, 1996, pp.1-
20. 
19
 CIA, Human Resource Exploitation Manual, Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1982, Manual 
acquired by National Security Archives, under the Freedom of Information Act.  The author can provide an 
analysis of the material that advocates torture within this manual on request. 
20 Interview with Kenneth LaPlante, WHINSEC Liaison to the US Army, US DoD, The Pentagon, 3 June, 2004.   
21 Ibid. 
22 US Inspector General, Report of the US Inspector General: Policy and Oversight, Washington DC: Office of 
the US Inspector General, 1997, pp.7-8.
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mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment 
such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; (b) collective 
punishments; (c) taking of hostages; (d) acts of terrorism; (e) outrages upon 
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, 
enforced prostitution and any form or indecent assault; (f) slavery and the 
slave trade in all their forms; (g) pillage; (h) threats to commit any or the 
foregoing acts.23 
Within the Handling Sources PDQXDOWKHPDWHULDOZKLFK³ZDVRUFRXOGEHLQWHUSUHWHGQRW
WREHFRQVLVWHQWZLWK86SROLF\´YLRODWHG$UWLFOH 24  As well as the passages mentioned 
in the ASDIO report, numerous others also pose a threat to human rights.25  One of the 
KLJKOLJKWHGSDVVDJHVVWDWHV³Every countermeasure that concentrates on the activities of 
the guerrillas, without taking into consideration the secret organization and the great 
preparation before the violence explodes, is destined to fail.  The mere elimination of the 
JXHUULOODVGRHVQRWDOWHULQDQ\ZD\WKHEDVLFRUJDQL]DWLRQRIWKHLQVXUJHQWV´26    Article 4 is 
clear that if individuals are not directly involved in hostilities, killing them is prohibited.  
7KHWHUPV³JXHUULOOD´³FRPPXQLVW´³LQVXUJHQW´DQG³HQHP\´DUHXVHGLQWHUFKDQJHDEO\ 
throughout the manual, and it is clear that the individuals referred to using these terms are 
political opponents of the government and the counterintelligence personnel.   
 
In addition to the passages highlighted in the ASDIO report, I identified 17 more within 
Handling Sources alone.  These included material that advocated infiltration of all types of 
legitimate social organisation, including youth groups, trade unions, and political parties; 
using fear and revenge to recruit counterintelligence agents; and, using criminals as 
informants.27  Some of the most disturbing passages relate to the termination of a 
FRXQWHULQWHOOLJHQFHHPSOR\HH¶VFRQWUDFW28  For example: 
If the insurrection advances to last phases and the guerrillas dominate certain 
areas that create borders, there is a series of things that could be done, 
especially if the main thing is to get rid of bin [sic] and it is not important if he 
talks with the guerrillas or not.  Changing his identification is a way that he 
could not pass verifications by the guerrilla security elements, sending him in 
a specially dangerous mission for which he has been inadequately prepared, or 
pass information to guerrilla security elements are methods that could be 
used.29  
This is betrayal and poses a direct threat of violence or death.  This violates Article 4.  A 
further passage advocates executions:  
                                                          
23 ICRC, 'Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)', International Committee of the Red Cross, 1977, 
<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/52d68d14de6160e0c12563da005fdb1b/d67c3971bcff1c10c125641e0052b545?Ope
nDocument>  Article 4. 
24 US Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence.  Fact Sheet Concerning Training Manuals Containing 
Materials Inconsistent With United States Policy. 
25 There is some confusion about the compilation and translation of the training manuals.  SOAW claim that the 
training manuals were originally published in English by the US Army, and were then translated into Spanish.  
They claim that the DoD say that the original English versions have been lost, and therefore no longer exist. 
The manuals available on the SOAW website are the English translations (by the Army) of the Spanish 
versions.  However, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence claims that the manuals were published in 
Spanish only, and that no English translations were prepared when they were first compiled. Thus, whereas 
SOAW states that the DoD claim that the English originals no longer exist, the DoD claims that English 
originals never existed, and that they were only compiled in Spanish.  As regards the English translations that 
are available from the SOAW website, which SOAW claims are translations by the US Army of the Spanish 
versions, they are, at times, poorly translated.     
26 US Department of Defence, Handling Sources, Washington DC: US Department of Defence, 1989, School of 
the Americas Training Manual, <http://www.soaw.org> 
27 Handling Sources, pp. 1-37 and p.128. 
28 Handling Sources, p.130. 
29 Handling Sources, p.130. 
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7KHFRXQWHULQWHOOLJHQFHDJHQWFRXOGLQFUHDVHWKHHPSOR\HH¶V value destroying 
the structure of the guerrilla organization around said employee.  This could be 
done by means of arrests, executions, or pacification taking care not to expose 
the employee as the information source.  If the employee is one of the few 
survivors, he could be a key member in a new or different guerrilla 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ$OVRWKHHPSOR\HH¶VUHSXWDWLRQFRXOGEHVWUHQJWKHQHGLQWKLV
occasion by means of story fabrication, documents and witnesses, who are not 
only credible but also difficult to refute, since there will be very few guerrillas 
that have survived.30   
Following arrest, individuals cease to be engaged in hostilities, and killing them is a 
violation of Article 4.  A further passage advocates terror and violence against employees 
no longer needed for intelligence gathering: 
In this carefully planned and controlled operation, the agent must discover 
ZKDWDFWLRQVDUHQHHGHGWRVWUHQJWKHQWKHHPSOR\HH¶VSUHWHQWLRQ>VLF@DQLGHDO
guerrilla recruit [sic].  A vital part of this program is the educational system 
tending to indoctrinate and recompense government employees who inform 
when a guerrilla element approaches them and tries to recruit them.  The 
FRXQWHULQWHOOLJHQFHDJHQWFRXOGFDXVHWKHDUUHVWRUGHWHQWLRQRIWKHHPSOR\HH¶V
parents, imprison the employee or give him a beating as part of the placement 
plan of said employee in the guerrilla organization.31   
Under Article 4, non-combatants should not be subjected to violence or to mental 
intimidation.  The calculated use of repression as advocated in this and other manuals in the 
context of military impunity, which was widespread under military governments in Latin 
America, is indicative of US complicity in repression.32  It was not simply the case that a 
KDQGIXORISDVVDJHV³ZHUHQRWRUFRXOGEHLQWHUSUHWHGQRWWREHFRQVLVWHQWZLWK86SROLF\´
as the DoD stated, but that these manuals are littered with passages which advocate gross 
human rights violations.  They were consistent  with CIA material that also advocated 
torture and assassination.  It was the release of these manuals that ignited a campaign 
against SOA, and culminated in its re-launch in 2001.     
 
WHINSEC - showcase of good practice  
 
In the late 1990s SOA training shifted from emphasising CI operations to prioritising 
appropriate civil-military relations and respect for human rights.  The changes in the 
training are genuine and WHINSEC now has a robust human rights programme.  These 
changes coincided with a shift in US foreign policy strategy in the South following the end 
of the Cold War, away from being characterised primarily by support for repression.  Since 
the end of the Cold War, US foreign policy strategy has been broadly characterised by the 
SURPRWLRQRIZKDWLVUHIHUUHGWRDV³GHPRFUDF\´&ULWLFVYDULRXVO\UHIHUWRWKLVDV³OLEHUDO
GHPRFUDF\´LQFOXGLQJWKHQHR-liberal form which comprises the minimal tax state with 
PLQLPDOVRFLDOZHOIDUH³PDUNHWdemocracy,´36 ³ORZ-LQWHQVLW\GHPRFUDF\´37 and 
³SRO\DUFK\´38  This is because they question the degree to which this form of democracy 
invites opting for alternatives that stray far from the systems and practices advocated by the 
capitalist elite, arguing that US democracy promotion tends to benefit multiple elite groups 
                                                          
30 Handling Sources. 
31 Handling Sources. 
32 The other manuals also contain similar passages and additional passages not mentioned in the ASDIO report 
which also advocate human rights violations.   
36
 N Chomsky, 'Market Democracy in a Neoliberal Order: Doctrines and Reality', University of Cape Town, 
1997, <http://www.bigeye.com/chomsky.htm> 
37
 B Gills; J Rocamora; and R Wilson, (eds.) Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World 
Order, London: Pluto, 1993, pp.3-34.  
38 W Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalisation, US Intervention, and Hegemony, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996, see chapter one. 
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both within those states and transnationally, sometimes at the expense of the material needs 
and human rights of the poor.  Whilst not the subject of this paper, the question of whether 
US training of military forces from the South is part of the process of liberal democracy 
promotion, or whether it serves more coercive purposes, is worthy of further research.   
 
Changes at SOA came about largely as a result of pressure from SOAW, bolstered by the 
release of the Spanish language manuals.  For the last few years SOAW has attracted 
10,000 people to its annual protest at the gates of Fort Benning.39  The movement began in 
1990, when Roy Bourgeois and nine others held a fast in protest against SOA.40  They 
learned that Salvadoran soldiers implicated in the massacre of all the inhabitants of El 
Mozote, El Salvador on 10 December 1981, had been trained at SOA.41  The official line 
from the DoD has always been that the re-launch had little to do with claims that it had 
been complicit in repression, and more to do with new approaches for the post-Cold War 
world.  Army Secretary, Louis Caldera stated:  
,W
VQRWJRLQJWREHRULHQWHGWRZDUGWKH&ROG:DUFKDOOHQJHVRIWKHSDVW>«@,W
will be oriented toward the security challenges oIWKHIXWXUH>«@VWUHQJWKHQLQJ
democracy, fighting drug trafficking, responding to natural disasters, building 
regional security and cooperation.42 
Yet various DoD officials attributed the transition to SOAW.  Joseph Leuer, Assistant Dean 
of Academics at WHINSEC, stated:    
>62$:@KDYHGRQHDORWDQGWKH\GRQ¶WUHDOLVHLW7KH\KDYHPDGHWKLV
LQVWLWXWHWKH86'R'¶VEHVWKXPDQULJKWVDQG,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZ
training institution.  They have allowed SOA and now WHINSEC to place 
into the military lexicon human rights in a positive light.  They took a $4 
million institution and made it the agenda at the national level.  Father Roy 
Bourgeois is the father of WHINSEC.43 
62$:IRUFHGWKH$6',2LQYHVWLJDWLRQZKLFKVHWLQPRWLRQ62$¶VUH-launch.  But SOAW 
are unprepared to concede that the changes are significant.   
 
WHINSEC is now transparent and subject to external oversight.  Over a two-month period, 
I was permitted open access, allowed to speak with any member of staff or student, and 
could sit in on any training session without prior arrangement.  Under Public Law 106-398, 
a Board of Visitors was established and has to be composed of various individuals from the 
Committee on Armed Services of both the Senate and House of Representatives; six people 
designated by the Secretary of Defence, including academics and religious and human 
ULJKWVJURXSV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRQHSHUVRQGHVLJQDWHGE\WKH6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWHWKHVHQLRU
military officer responsible for training and doctrine for the Army; and the commander of 
SOUTHCOM.44   8QGHUWKHODZWKH%RDUGLVUHTXLUHGWRPHHWDQQXDOO\WR³,QTXLUHLQWRWKH
curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, and academic methods of the 
                                                          
39 Interviewees from the DoD, WHINSEC, and SOA Watch all agreed on the figure of 10,000 protestors. 
40
 Interview with Roy Bourgeois at his office, situated outside the gates of Fort Benning, Columbus, Georgia, 
20 July 2004. 
41 UNSC, 'From Madness to Hope: the 12-year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for 
El Salvador', United Nations Security Council, 1993, 
<http://www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/reports/el_salvador/tc_es_03151993_V.html> 
42 K Burger, 'Army Secretary, DoD Back 'Serious Reform' at the School of the Americas', US Department of 
Defence - Inside the Army, 2000, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/usarsa/main.htm> 
43 Interview with Joseph Leuer, Assistant Dean of Academics, WHINSEC, 16 August 2004. 
44 US Department of Defence.  Floyd D. Spence National Defence Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 2001.  10 
USC 2166.  Public Law 106-398.   
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Institute, [and] other matters relating to the Institute that the Board deciGHVWRFRQVLGHU´45  
The Board has elected to meet twice per year.46   
 
WHINSEC also now has the most highly developed human rights programme of all US 
military training.  :+,16(&¶V&KDUWHUUHTXLUHVWKDWDOOFRXUVHVZKLFKODVWZHHNV
provide a minimum of eight hours mandatory instruction on human rights, the rule of law, 
due process, civilian control of the military, and the role of the military in democratic 
society.49  WHINSEC is the only US military institution where human rights instruction is 
incorporated into every course.50  This minimum is not only adhered to, but exceeded.  
WHINSEC students actually receive more than this, because the democracy part is taught 
separately.  They therefore get a minimum of 11 hours.51  The Board of Visitors has played 
an important role in developing the human rights programme.  Much of the human rights 
training I observed was of a high standard.   
 
Despite this, SOAW continue to focus on WHINSEC.  Discussions with various SOAW 
staff members revealed that even they do not believe that WHINSEC poses any immediate 
threat to human rights.  I asked Roy Bourgeois if he believes WHINSEC is promoting 
torture.  He replied: 
No, not torture 101.  But just bringing those soldiers to US institutions for 
combat training, that to me is a contradiction to what people in Latin America 
need.  I have no doubt that the teaching in the past did involve torture.  But our 
scrutiny now forces the Pentagon to put the school under the microscope.  
%HIRUHWKH\FRXOGJHWDZD\ZLWKLW1RZWKH\FDQ¶W52 
Yet SOAW continue to make the claim that WHINSEC teaches torture.  In a campaigning 
video posted on the SOAW website in April 2006, consisting of a spoof recruiting tool for 
WHINSEC, the voice-over states: 
At the School of the Americas, Western Hemisphere Institute for Security 
&RRSHUDWLRQZH¶UHVHULRXVDERXWVXFFHVV>«@7KHFXUULFXOXP for this 
upcoming semester includes: Bleeding Edge Torture Schemes, Streamlined 
Sniper Training, Interrogation Tactic Focus Groups.53 
This is simply untrue.  As discussed above, there is no evidence that there is any training 
which advocates the use of torture at WHINSEC, and even the SOAW leadership admit 
WKLV7KHUHDUHQR³VQLSHU´FRXUVHVRQRIIHUHLWKHUQRULQGHHGDQ\FRXUVHVVSHFLILFDOO\
oriented towards use of weapons, although all military WHINSEC staff, as with all 
members of the US armed forces, do have to keep their own weapons maintenance and 
weapons use training up to date.  Neither are there any courses on interrogation or 
psychological operations on offer, neither have there been since the School was re-
launched.  The animation also contains DIDEULFDWHG³TXRWDWLRQ´ZKLFKLWLVFODLPHGDUHWKH
words of General Vazquez Velasco, former head of the Venezuelan Army: 
                                                          
45 Ibid. 
46 The minutes from these meetings are documented and available at:  
<http://www.fido.gov/facadatabase/AgenciesList.asp> 
49 US Department of Defence, 'Directive Number 5111.12.  Subject: Western Hemisphere Institute for Security 
Cooperation', US Department of Defence, 2002, 
<http://www.benning.army.mil/whinsec/uploadedFiles/InstituteCharter.pdf> 
50J Cope, 'International Military Education and Training: An Assessment', Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, 1995, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/macnair/mcnair44/m44cont.html> 
51 Interview with Major Tony Raimondo, Judge Advocate and Chief of Human Rights Training, WHINSEC, 9 
August 2004.  The breakdown and explanation of the human rights and democracy training was also given at 
the WHINSEC Board Meeting on 16 July 2004. 
52
 Interview with Father Roy Bourgeois at his office, situated outside the gates of Fort Benning, Columbus, 
Georgia, 20 July 2004. 
53
 School of Americas Watch, Shut Down the SOA Flash Movie (Washington DC: School of Americas Watch, 
2006), <http://www.soaw.org/new/flash.php> 
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My time at the School of the Americas laid the groundwork for my attempt to 
overthrow the democratically elected government of Venezuela in 2002.  
Maybe one day I can join the ranks of many of my SOA peers and become 
military dictator, [cough] president of my own country.54 
General Vazquez Velasco did attend the School of the Americas in 1988 at which time he 
was a Lieutenant Colonel.  He took the Command and General Staff Officers Course.  He 
was also one of the military leaders involved in the coup to overthrow Hugo Chavez in 
DOWKRXJKKHFODLPHGWKDWLW³ZDVQRWDFRXSQRULQVXERUGLQDWLRQEXWDSRVLWLRQRI
solidarity with all thH9HQH]XHODQSHRSOH´55  There is no record of him ever having made a 
statement linking his involvement with the coup and the training he received at SOA.   
 
In addition, reference is made in the video to research undertaken by Kate McCoy.  The 
video states³5HVHDUFKGRQHDWWKH8QLYHUVLW\RI:LVFRQVLQVKRZVWKDWWKHPRUH62$
FODVVHVDVROGLHUWDNHVWKHPRUHOLNHO\KHLVWRFRPPLWKXPDQULJKWVDEXVHV´56  0F&R\¶V
findings, however, are demonstrably false due to a flawed methodology.  She undertook a 
statistical analysis of data relating to graduates over a forty year period.57  She constructed a 
sample of 11,797 graduates which includes students from six countries (Argentina, Brazil, 
Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador and Panama) who attended SOA between 1960 and 2000.58   
The dataset draws on student records of graduates from its inception until 2000, which were 
released by the US government under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), following 
pressure from SOAW.59  The dataset also draws on a SOAW database entitleG³1RWRULRXV
*UDGXDWHV´ZKLFKLVFRPSLOHGIURPLQIRUPDWLRQIURPYDULRXVQRQ-governmental 
organisations focusing on human rights, media, and UN Truth Commissions, and indicates 
whether any allegations have been made which link individuals listed in the records 
released under the FOIA to acts of repression.60   McCoy refers to such cases as those in 
ZKLFKVWXGHQWVRULQVWUXFWRUVZHUH³FDXJKWIRUKXPDQULJKWVYLRODWLRQV´61  McCoy does not 
GHILQHZKDWVKHPHDQVE\³FDXJKW´DQGVKHIDLOVWRQRWHWKDWVKHLVDFWually referring to 
cases in which allegations of repression were made, nearly all of which have not been 
proven.  These amount to 153 cases in total.  So of the 11,797 graduates within her dataset, 
there are allegations against 153 of them, which amounts to 1.3 per cent of the total number 
of graduates included within her dataset.  The records collated by SOAW reveal that 9 of 
WKHJUDGXDWHVWKDW0F&R\VWDWHVKDYHEHHQ³FDXJKW´IRUKXPDQULJKWVDEXVHVKDYH
actually been convicted.62  Of these 9, three were sentenced by Peruvian military courts, 
and three were sentenced by civil courts in Argentina, El Salvador and Panama.  One 
Guatemalan was sentenced by a US court, and it is not clear what type of court sentenced 
the other two, who were from Peru.63  Thus, of those against whom allegations have been 
made, there is a conviction rate of 6 per cent.  This amounts to convictions against just 9 
out of 11,797 graduates of the School, or 0.08 per cent of all graduates.  The remaining 144 
graduates against whom allegations have been made have not been found guilty of any 
crime.  Neither is there any evidence within the SOAW dataset to indicate whether legal 
proceedings have been brought against any of the remaining 144 graduates allegedly 
involved in repression.  McCoy fails to point this out.  Of course it is possible that some of 
the allegations made were false, a further point that McCoy fails to make.  Thus, her dataset 
is further invalidated because some of the cases she refers to may be false.   
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research suggests, given the context of impunity.  Had she acknowledged that her findings 
were based on allegations of repression, rather than proven, she might have been able to 
make her case against SOA more effectively.  In a climate of extreme political violence and 
LPSXQLW\SHRSOHDUHXQOLNHO\WRUHSRUWUHSUHVVLRQRXWRIIHDURIUHSULVDOV0F&R\¶V
findings may only be the tip of the iceberg.   
 
In interviews with SOAW staff I pointeGRXWWKHIODZHGPHWKRGRORJ\RI0F&R\¶VUHVHDUFK
which they acknowledged.  Jacqueline Baker, then SOAW legislative coordinator stated 
WKDW³LWLVQRWRXUVWURQJHVWOREE\LQJWRRO´DQG(ULF/H&RPSWHVDLG³,DJUHHZLWK\RXU





included in the video.   
 
Many SOAW members continue to believe that WHINSEC is no different from SOA, and 
that it continues to pose a threat to human rights, despite the acknowledgement among 
62$:¶VOHDGHUVKLSWKDWWKLVLVQRWWKHFDVH7KHLQFOXVLRQRIPLVLQIRUPDWLRQLQ62$:¶V
campaigning tools, such as the flash animation, help to explain these assumptions among 
the SOAW membership.  As a consequence, and conveniently for the Department of 
Defence, attention remains focused on WHINSEC, diverting attention from the majority of 
US military training, which remains secretive and devoid of adequate human rights 
training.  The change in focus at WHINSEC to the promotion of appropriate civil-military 
relations seems to be a positive step forward, in that it rejects the notion that the military 
should play any role in governing the country, and should, instead be subordinate to 
civilian leaders.  Courses such as Resource Management and Democratic Sustainment do 
focus on ensuring that military forces are accountable, and this is a necessary and important 
part of ensuring that military forces are at the service of civilian governments.  
Nevertheless, counter-drug operations is an area which could be undertaken by a variety of 
civilian institutions including the police, rather than the military.  How then can training of 
military forces in such areas be justified, when these roles could be fulfilled by civilian 
institutions?  I suggest that using the military to perform such roles is not necessarily the 
mark of progressive democracy, and can impede progress in the area of human rights.   
I also asked Bourgeois why the focus of SOAW is still WHINSEC.  He replied: 
This movement is not so much about the school but about US foreign policy.  
But as activists we know what will mobilise people.  We have to maintain our 
focus.  If we said we are a moving out of the SOA issue and onto the bigger 
issue we would be losing our flagship with so much history.66   
This view was shared by other staff from the SOAW office in Washington DC including 
Eric LeCompte: 
Our efforts on foreign policy need to be much bigger.  It is not our intention to 
stop with one school.  The existence of the school does give us time to build a 
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movement, but it needs to be a movement with broader connections to foreign 
SROLF\,EHOLHYHZHZLOOFORVHWKHVFKRROEXW,KRSHLWZRQ¶WEHWRRVRRQVR
that we can build a movement to make the connections with foreign policy.67 
Thus the strategy is that if wider questions of US foreign policy are to be raised, the 
movement needs to retain momentum directed specifically at WHINSEC, because of the 
symbolic power of its murky past.   
 
A further strategy of the SOAW leadership has been to meet with senior government and 
military officials from Latin American states and to try to persuade them to stop sending 
their personnel to WHINSEC.  SOAW report that they have successfully persuaded the 
Venezuelan, Argentina and Uruguay governments to cease sending nationals from those 
states to WHINSEC, following meetings between SOAW delegations and senior officials 
from the governments of those states in 2004, in the case of Venezuela, and 2006 in the 
cases of Uruguay and Argentina.68  Missing froP62$:¶VDFFRXQWVRIWKHVHSURFHVVHVLV
the fact that, because of the refusal by the governments of Venezuela and Uruguay to sign 
an Article 98 agreement with the US, agreeing not to seek prosecution of US citizens in the 
International Criminal Court, all IMET, FMF, Excess Defence Articles, and non-drug 
Emergency Drawdown Authority Funds have been withdrawn from those states.69  That 
means that those states cannot send their personnel to WHINSEC under the IMET and 
FMF programmes, and could only receive training at WHINSEC if they funded it out of 
their own budgets.  The Uruguayan and Venezuelan governments have taken a stand 
against the US over the issue of freedom from prosecution at the International Criminal 
Court of US citizens, and for this reason are no longer eligible to receive training at 
WHINSEC funded by the US.  Whether or not they would have withdrawn their personnel 
from receiving WHINSEC training if this were not the case is not clear.  In the case of 
Argentina, there had already been a decline in the numbers of students that were being sent 
to WHINSEC before SOAW met with the Argentine Defence Minister, Nilda Garré.  Five 
to six sergeants were due to attend WHINSEC for the NCO Professional Development 
Course, in session in April 2006, but only one of them attended.70  SOAW nevertheless 
report that Garré agreed this would be the last individual that Argentina would send to 
WHINSEC.71  These withdrawals of Latin American forces from WHINSEC cannot simply 
be attributed to the efforts of SOAW.  They are a symptom of wider resistance on the part 
of Latin American military and political leaders to US policies.72  The policy of 
withdrawing IMET and FMF training as a punishment against those states who refuse to 
sign Article 98 agreements is deeply unpopular within the Department of Defence, and 
General John Craddock, Commander of SOUTHCOM recently testified before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee that this action was opening up opportunities for China to 
provide training to the military forces of those states whose IMET and FMF training has 
been withdrawn.  Indeed China is already providing some non-lethal military training in 
Spanish to those states.73              
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Focusing on WHINSEC is not the best use of resources, given the positive nature of its 
training and the urgent need for greater scrutiny of training beyond WHINSEC, which, as I 
will show, is far-reaching but highly secretive.  The movement could begin targeting other 
training providers, such as Fort Bragg, where Special Operations forces are trained, or Fort 
Huachuca, where intelligence training is formulated.  Rather than close WHINSEC, as 
SOAW advocate, pressure should be put on the Department of Defence to ensure that at the 
very least, all other US military training initiatives should be subject to the same level of 
external oversight as WHINSEC, and that all those in receipt of US military training, 
whether US nationals or foreigners, should receive the same levels of human rights and 
democracy training as WHINSEC students do.  This is not to say that the question of 
whether the human rights training provided is effective should be abandoned.  Indeed, 
greater pressure needs to be exerted upon the Department of Defence to reveal precisely 
how they can be so sure that this training is effective, and especially bearing in mind the 
Haditha massacre in Iraq.   
 
Training beyond WHINSEC  
 
WHINSEC training has become a model of best practice but is undermined in five ways.  
Firstly, the majority of the training beyond WHINSEC remains unaccountable, and is not 
subject to the same requirements to provide human rights training as WHINSEC.  
WHINSEC represents just one percent of all US training of foreign military forces.  
Currently no other US training institution is subject to the same rules as WHINSEC with 
regard to mandatory human rights training.  All individuals, domestic or foreign, in receipt 
of US military training, receive training on the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC).  The 
primary document relating to this is Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land 
Warfare.74   US Army personnel at WHINSEC regularly commented that their own 
experience of standard US training on the LOAC was very basic compared with 
:+,16(&¶VKXPDQULJKWVWUDLQLQJ7KLVZDVFRQILUPHGE\DUHSUHVHQWDWLYHIURPWKH
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).  He was delivering three days of training 
at WHINSEC on International Humanitarian Law.  He indicated that he visits a number of 
US training institutions, both for US nationals and foreign forces, but he is not given the 
three-GD\VORWWKDWKHJHWVDW:+,16(&+HVLPSO\KDVWRH[SODLQZKDWWKH,&5&¶VUHPLW
is, as part of the LOAC training.  I observed his sessions and found them to be some of the 
best in terms of challenging the students to really think through their responsibilities under 
international law.  The students had to grapple with difficult combat simulations, and the 
message was reiterated time and again that they must do everything possible to resist illegal 
orders.75  The ICRC representative said he has come across D³SLFNDQGFKRRVH´DWWLWXGH
among US military personnel where human rights training is concerned.76  Whilst the DoD 
invites an ICRC representative to deliver human rights training at WHINSEC, and limited 
LOAC training at other US military training instituWLRQVLWFKRVHWRLJQRUHWKH,&5&¶V
investigation into treatment of detainees at Guantanomo Bay and Abu Ghraib, and other 
detention facilities, until Pentagon memorandums on ICRC visits to Guantanomo were 
leaked to the Washington Post, which raises the question of how seriously the US 
administration and DoD take the ICRC in the current climate.77   
 
7KHVHFRQGZD\LQZKLFK:+,16(&¶VHIIRUWVDUHXQGHUPLQHGUHODWHVWRWKHSURYLVLRQRI
training to military personnel from countries with appalling human rights records.  The 
Leahy Law, implemented in 1996, was intended to prevent individuals with poor human 
rights records from receiving training under the counter-narcotics programme.  It was 
extended to all forms of State Department training, and then in 1999, to training provided 
                                                          
74 US Department of Defence, 'Field Manual 27-10.  The Law of Land Warfare', US Department of Defence, 
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by the Department of Defence.78  Throughout this period, however, under the auspices of 
the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) programme, the US was able to continue to 
provide training to personnel from countries that were banned from receiving training on 
human rights grounds.  0DVTXHUDGLQJDVWUDLQLQJSURJUDPPHVIRUWKH86¶RZQ6SHFLDO
Forces, JCET was used to provide training for countries that were banned from receiving 
training because of their poor human rights records.  Dana Priest found that under JCET, 
US Special Forces trained foreign troops from countries such as Indonesia, Colombia and 
Pakistan, which Congress had blacklisted.79  Congress cut off all IMET funding to 
Indonesia in 1991 when it was discovered that Indonesian troops supplied with US 
weapons had massacred at least 280 unarmed people in Dili, East Timor.  Some Expanded 
IMET (E-IMET) programmes were offered in 1995.  The E-IMET programme was 
developed by Congress for countries that were banned from receiving IMET, and included 
training in civil-military relations, military justice, resource management and human rights, 
but with no combat training.80  However, between 1991 and 1998 US Special Forces 
conducted 41 training exercises with Indonesian troops, including with 26 individuals from 
.RSDVVXV,QGRQHVLD¶VRZQ6SHFLDO2SHUDWLRQVXQLWZKLFK86DQG$XVWUDOLDQGHIHQFH
officials knew to be behind killings and torture in East Timor and Irian Jaya.  US officials 
stated that the training involved Counterterrorism, mission planning, sniper skills, close-
quarters urban warfare, crowd control, and rapid infiltration of troops.  The East Timor 
Action Network found that the training had also included psychological operations.81   The 
Department of Defence insisted that discussions of international human rights standards 
had also been included in the training.82  The effectiveness of whatever efforts were made 
to instil notions of respect for human rights and civilian control of the military during the 
JCET operations in Indonesia, was called into question by the remarks of Colonel Charles 
McFetridge, defence attaché at the US embassy in Jakarta, to Priest.  He told Priest that 
ZKHQKHEHJDQWR³SXVKWKHLVVXHRIFLYLOLDQFRQWURORIWKHPLOLWDU\WKH,QGRQHVLDQVEHFDPH
incredulous.  7KH\ZRXOGORRNDWPHDQGVD\µ:H¶UHQRWWUDLQLQJFLYLOLDQVWREH
JHQHUDOV¶´83  The message was clearly not getting through.   
 
6LQFHWKHDGYHQWRIWKH³:DURQ7HUURU´,0(7WUDLQLQJKDVEHHQUH-introduced to countries 
that were previously banned from receiving training by Congress, Indonesia among them.  
Lumpe notes that by March 2002 Bush had identified nineteen countries in Asia, Africa, 
WKH0LGGOH(DVW&HQWUDO$VLDDQG/DWLQ$PHULFDDVDOOLHVLQWKH³:DURQ7HUURU´<HWVKH
adds, the security forces in fourteen of these countries had been cited by the State 
Department for committing serious human rights abuses.84  Indonesia was a case in point.  
Mary Robinson, who was the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights visited 
East Timor in 1999 reported that even during the 1990s: 
There was overwhelming evidence that there had been a deliberate, vicious 
and systematic campaign of gross violations of human rights in East Timor, 
including mass killings, forcible expulsions, violence against women and a 
EUHDNGRZQRIODZDQGRUGHU7KHH[WUHPHYLROHQFH«ZDVLQLWLDWHGE\
different militia groups, in which elements of security forces were also 
involved.85   
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This demonstrates that the legislation in place is wholly insufficient.  Even the limited laws 
that DUHLQSODFHDUHQRZEHLQJLJQRUHGLQWKHQDPHRIWKH³:DURQ7HUURU´7KHPLOLWDU\
ban on training to Indonesia was retained by Congress under the Foreign Operations 
Appropriations Act, but a last minute addition to the 2002 Defence Department 
Appropriations Act included $17.9 million to establish a Regional Defence and Counter-
Terrorism Fellowship Programme.86  Indonesia received $600,000 worth of IMET training 
in 2004.87  If the US administration were genuinely committed to ensuring that foreign 
military training assists in improving human rights, the loopholes that enable the laws to be 
circumvented would be closed; training would not be offered to countries with poor human 
rights records, and US Special Forces would not be assisting military forces implicated in 




on the principle of pre-emption, which may result in violations of the LOAC.  The pre-
emption principle is discussed by Juan Cole and an anonymous contributor to his web log.88  
The Rules of Engagement and the Standing Rules of Engagement are subsumed by the 
LOAC, and cannot authorise anything that would be prohibited under the LOAC.89  
Nevertheless, the principle of pre-emption enables military personnel to protect themselves 
IURPDQ\WKLQJWKH\SHUFHLYHWREHKRVWLOHLQWHQW&ROH¶VFRUUHVSRQGHQWDrgues that as a 
UHVXOWWKHUHLVJUHDWSRWHQWLDOIRUWKH³OLEHUDOXVHRIIRUFH´ZKLFKPD\UHVXOWLQKXPDQ
rights violations.90  7KHUHIRUHHYHQLI:+,16(&¶VKXPDQULJKWVWUDLQLQJZHUHWREH
emulated across the US military, it is possible that the LOAC might be violated when 
individuals take pre-emptive actions, as is permitted under the Rules of Engagement and 
the Standing Rules of Engagement, when they perceive the acts of others in conflict zones 
to be hostile, even if they may not be.   
 
The fourth way in which WHINSEC is undermined is that whilst its human rights training 
was of a very high standard, some discussions indicated that attitudes towards human rights 
are not positive, even among WHINSEC staff.  During one session which focused on civil-
military relations in Colombia, the only mention of human rights organisations was in the 
FRQWH[WRIDFDVHVWXG\ZKLFKIRUPHGDIRUPDOSDUWRIWKHFRXUVH¶VFXUULFXOXPZKHUHWKH
students were encouraged to imagine they were part of a committee dealing with human 
rights organisations making false accusations against the armed forces.91  Throughout the 
session this was the only mention of human rights organisations, and they were being cast 
in an extremely negative light.  This is subtle, but to phrase the scenariRLQWHUPVRI³IDOVH
DOOHJDWLRQV´UDWKHUWKDQVLPSO\³DOOHJDWLRQV´VHQGVVLJQDOVWRWKHVWXGHQWVDERXWZKDWWKH\
can expect of human rights organisations.   
 
Finally, there is a complacent attitude among DoD personnel about the need for human 
rights trainLQJDPRQJ86IRUFHV,DVNHG'R'UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVZK\WKH86¶RZQIRUFHVDUH
not provided with the same levels of human rights training as WHINSEC students.  One 
representative commented: 
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$PHULFDQ$UP\SHUVRQQHOGRQ¶WQHHGWRJRLQWRWKHVDPHGHSWKRIKXPDn 
rights and democracy training because US personnel have a pre-existing 
cultural understanding of this before they get anywhere near training.92   
This was a typical attitude among Pentagon and WHINSEC staff.  When such attitudes 
prevail, it is not surprising that US military personnel are assumed to be mostly beyond 
committing human rights violations.  It is also unclear whether the human rights training at 
WHINSEC is effective, and no one within the DoD or at WHINSEC was able to provide a 
persuasive answer to this question.  Just because all the legal requirements concerning 
mandatory human rights training are met, does not mean that it is effective in preventing 
repression.  Neither does it mean that the administration is committed to preventing 
repression.   
 
Condoning repression since 9/11  
 
6LQFHWKHDGYHQWRIWKH³:DURQ7HUURU´WUDLQLQJKDVEHHQRIIHUHGWRFRXQWULHVWKDWZHUH
previously banned by Congress because of their poor human rights records.  Laura Lumpe 
notes that by March 2002 Bush had identified 19 countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, 
&HQWUDO$VLDDQG/DWLQ$PHULFDDVDOOLHVLQWKH³:DURQ7HUURU´<HWVKHDGGVWKH
security forces in 14 of these countries had been cited by the Department of State for 
committing serious human rights abuses.93  This makes a mockery of attempts to establish 
credible human rights training at WHINSEC. This has coincided with a resurgence of 
support for repression in US foreign policy strategy since 9/11, which sits alongside US 
democracy promotion efforts.   
 
Figures within the current US administration have been involved in attempts to redefine 
WRUWXUH-D\%\EHHKHDGRIWKH-XVWLFH'HSDUWPHQW¶V2IILFHRI/HJDO&RXQVHOZURWHD
PHPRUDQGXPIRUWKHDWWHQWLRQRIWKH3UHVLGHQW¶V&RXQVHOLQHDUO\$XJXVW, advising on 
what constitutes torture: 
:HFRQFOXGHWKDWIRUDQDFWWRFRQVWLWXWHWRUWXUH>«@LWPXVWLQIOLFWSDLQWKDWLV
difficult to endure.  Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in 
intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ 
failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.  For purely mental pain 
or suffering to amount to torture under Section 2340 it must result in 
significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g. lasting for months 
or even years.94   
+HFRQFOXGHVWKDWZKLOVWVHQVRU\GHSULYDWLRQWHFKQLTXHV³PD\DPRXQWWRFUXHOLQKXPDQRU
degrading treatment, they do not produce pain or suffering of the necessary intensity to 
PHHWWKHGHILQLWLRQRIWRUWXUH´95  7KHPHPRUDQGXPFRQWLQXHV³)URP these decisions, we 
conclude that there is a wide range of such techniques that will not rise to the level of 
WRUWXUH´96  The implication is that such techniques may be admissible.97  President Bush 
had previously insisted in a secret statement that memberVRIWKH7DOLEDQDQG$O4D¶LGDEH
treated humanely.98  'HVSLWH%XVK¶VFDOOIRUKXPDQHWUHDWPHQWLQLQWHUYLHZVZLWK'R'
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personnel it was apparent that there was widespread acceptance of the techniques Bybee 
referred to.  I asked Ken LaPlante about the redefinitions of torture, and where he thought 
the line should be drawn.  He stated: 
The original intent was to get information.  But these things must have been 
repeated so many times that it became unclear what the redefinitions were.  
This was an evolutionary process.  I draw the line with what the law allows.  
Abu Ghraib happened because of a leadership failure.  The definition of 
torture allows flexibility.  How can you define comfort?  In terms of the 
techniques, some are not wrong, e.g. deprivation of light, rest is 
uncomfortable.  Temporary withholding of food to disorientate an individual 
and to show them that you are in charge is also fair game.  Placing a bag over 
VRPHRQH¶VKHDGWRGLVRULHQWDWHWKHPDQGVKRZWKHPWKDW\RXDUHLQFKDUJHLV
also acceptable.   In my training I had a bag put over my head.  Putting a sack 
RQDJX\¶VKHDGLVQRWZURQJXSWRDSRLQW%XWZRXOG,VRDNLWZLWKZDWHUVR
WKDWWKH\IHHOOLNHWKH\¶UHVXIIRFDWLQJ"1R,¶YHKDGWKDWGRQHLQWUDLQLQJDQG
LW¶VDZIXO1RWSURYLGLQJfood at all is a violation.  Taking their clothes off 
and walking them naked to get new clothes, sure, it could take five hours to 
WDNHWKHPWRJHWQHZFORWKHVWKDW¶VQRWZURQJ%XWWKHQ\RXDUHPDNLQJD
calculated risk doing something like that, particularly if their culture is 
sensitive to the immodesty of it, but then you are accountable if you decide to 
take that risk, and you would justify it.  Enforced nudity for days on end 
without intent is also a violation.  Sexual contortions and abuse, and 
photograph-taking are all violations.99 
LaPlante indicates not only his acceptance of some acts prohibited under Article 4, but also 
that there was confusion about what precisely constitutes torture, whether the 
administration had actually redefined torture, and if so, what was permissible.   
 
By April 2003, a working group commissioned to report on detainee interrogations, headed 
by Donald Rumsfeld, recommended the approval of a whole set of techniques for use in 
LQWHUURJDWLRQRI³XQODZIXOcombatants.´  Among these were hooding, but only during 
interrogation; dietary manipulation, but with no intended deprivation of food and water and 
no adverse medical or cultural effects; environmental manipulation, such as adjustment of 
temperature or introducing unpleasant smells, but not in a way that would cause injury; 
sleep adjustment which entails the adjustment of sleeping times, but not sleep deprivation; 
threat of transfer to a third country that the subject is likely to fear would subject him to 
torture or death; forced grooming, i.e. forcing a detainee to shave their hair or beard; 
prolonged standing, but not for more than four hours in a 24 hour period; sleep deprivation, 
allowing individuals to rest briefly but repeatedly waking them, but not for longer than four 
days in succession; removal of all clothing, with no time limit placed on this; increasing 
anxiety by use of aversions, e.g. the presence of a dog without directly threatening action. 
101
    
 
Under Article 4, threats of torture are a form of mental torture and are prohibited.  It is only 
a few small steps from these degrading acts to the torture that occurred at Abu Ghraib.  
This is of grave concern in light of the widespread confusion that LaPlante alluded to.  Also 
of concern is the recommendation that detainees be threatened with transfer to third party 
countries where they might be tortured.  This was not limited to threats, but has occurred 
since 2001. 
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The extent of the programme in which the US transfers terror suspects to third party states 
that use torture, a policy known as extraordinary rendition, is unknown. Various detainees 
LQWKH³:DURQ7HUURU´KDYHLQGLFDWHGWKDWWKH\ZHUHIORZQWRWKLUGSDUW\FRXQWULHVRIWHQ
Egypt, on a US Gulfstream V jet, were held there and tortured.  Alleged victims include 
Mamdouh Habib, Muhammed Zery and Ahmed Agiza. A handful of extraordinary 
rendition victims are being represented by human rights lawyers against the US 
government. 105  ,QIRUPDWLRQIURPDLUSRUWRIILFLDOV¶SODQHVSRWWHUVDQGSXEOLFGRFXPHQWV
indicate that the same jet, with tail number N379P, has been used to transport detainees into 
or out of Jakarta, Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt and Sweden.  It has also been reported that the 
CIA is running secret prisons in Eastern Europe to which a number of terror suspects have 
been flown, and held without trial.107  The jet is registered to a private US company, which 
lists directors and officers who seem only to exist on paper, each of whom have recently 
been issued Social Security numbers and an address consisting only of a post box.108  
Civilian aircraft landing records indicate that the jet has permission to use US military 
airfields worldwide The CIA has refused to comment on the policy and any link it has with 
this jet.111  Meanwhile, following the passing of legislation by the Senate that would outlaw 
the cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of anyone held by the US, anonymous officials 
informed the New York Times and Washington Post that Dick Cheney, vice-president, 
proposed a change so that the law would not apply to counter-terror operations abroad or to 
operations conducted by the CIA.112 
  
Any efforts to instigate foreign military training that fosters an attitude of respect for 
human rights, as at WHINSEC, are undermined by attitudes within the administration 
towards torture and by policies which violate Article 4.  The credibility of US claims to be 
promoting democracy in the South is called into question in light of these attempts to 
circumvent human rights law, and in light of the provision of military aid to countries with 
poor human rights records.   
 
Even at WHINSEC there are signs of a return to less transparent means.  At the end of 
2004, the White HRXVHXQH[SHFWHGO\LQWHUYHQHGLQWKHVHOHFWLRQRI:+,16(&¶V%RDUGRI
Visitors, objecting to the reinstatement of all but one of the members, and insisting on the 
selection of new, White House-DSSURYHGPHPEHUV7KRVHVDFNHGLQFOXGHGWKH%RDUG¶V
chair, Steven Schneebaum, a human rights lawyer and outspoken critic of US policy in the 
³:DURQ7HUURU´DQG'HERUDK$YDQWDQDFDGHPLFERWKRIZKRPZHUHH[WUHPHO\DFWLYHLQ
ensuring the instigation of credible human rights training at WHINSEC.  The only retained 
Board member was Jose Sorzano, former deputy ambassador to the UN under Jeanne 
Kirkpatrick, and known for his right wing views.113  He is now the chairman of the Board, 
replacing Steven Schneebaum.  The new members include Ben Hand, a republican and 
2006 candidate for the Alabama Supreme court, Reverend Cletus Kiley from the US 
conference of Catholic Bishops, Reverend Robert Morlino, fourth bishop of Madison, 
Wisconsin, María Domínguez, an immigration lawyer from Miami, and Victor Bonilla, 
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retired senior advisor to the Organisation of American States.114  In addition, at the end of 
2004, Retired Lieutenant General Gordon Sumner, previously chairman of the Inter-
American Defence Board and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Latin 
American Affairs, and now Consultant with Sumner Associates, was appointed as an 





DQDO\VLV´ZKLFKLQFOXGHVGHIHQGLQJ,VUDHO¶VSROLF\LQ3DOHVWLQH115  Sumner is also a 
member of the Council for National Policy, which brings together political, business and 
religious leaders to plan the strategy of the religious right in the US.116   Deborah Avant 
rightly expressed FRQFHUQWKDWLQOLJKWWKH:KLWH+RXVH¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQDQGRIWKLVVKLIWWR
the right in the Board of Visitors, WHINSEC may not be able to resist the general trend in 
US foreign policy towards less transparent and more repressive means.117    
 
A further recent development at WHINSEC which is a cause for concern is the diminishing 
number of Latin American states taking up places on the courses which place a heavy 
emphasis on democracy and human rights.  According to Lee Rials, WHINSEC public 
affairs officer, two courses have had to be dropped in 2006 until interest picks up again.  
These are the Democratic Sustainment course and the International Operational Law 
course.118  It has not been possible to ascertain why this is.  It may simply be attributable to 
the withdrawal of troops from WHINSEC by some Latin American states, or the stopping 
of funding as a result of states refusing to sign agreements on the ICC.  Whilst WHINSEC 
staff attribute this to lack of interest, it may also be that the shifting strategies in US foreign 
policy more broadly have had a knock-on effect upon the types of courses that the 
Department of Defence actually push in terms of advertising and recruitment, in line with 
their own changing priorities and increasing emphasis on counter-terrorism activities, rather 
than on democracy promotion and human rights strategies emphasised under the Clinton 
administration.119  Or it might be that Latin American states themselves are self-selecting 




This paper has demonstrated that throughout the Cold War, SOA did condone and advocate 
repression.  The notorious Spanish language manuals were not anathema to US foreign 
policy, but were typical of a CI strategy adopted by the US throughout the Cold War.  
WHINSEC, by contrast, is not engaged in encouraging students to violate international law, 
prioritising instead appropriate civil-military relations and respect for human rights.  This is 
largely thanks to the efforts of SOAW.  Neither has WHINSEC, as yet, played any part in 
WKHUHVXUJHQFHRIVXSSRUWIRUUHSUHVVLRQWKDWZHKDYHZLWQHVVHGLQWKH³:DURQ7HUURU´
The same cannot be said of the majority of US training of military forces from the South, or 
RIWKH86¶RZQPLOLWDU\SHUVonnel.  The remainder of the training is unaccountable, not 
required to incorporate the same high standard of human rights training that is present at 
WHINSEC, and increasingly being made available to countries with poor human rights 
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records.  In this sense, as opposed to WHINSEC, the remainder of the training is consistent 
with coercive elements of US foreign policy since 9/11.  Even WHINSEC, following White 
House intervention in the selection of the Board, may cease to be so transparent, and may 
no longer be subject to the rigorous scrutiny that previous Board members insisted upon. 
 
SOAW was crucial in forcing the re-launch of SOA, and to the introduction of extensive 
human rights training at WHINSEC.  Nevertheless, they continue to campaign for its 
closure.  Discussions with the SOAW leadership revealed that even they do not believe that 
WHINSEC poses any immediate threat to human rights.  Roy Bourgeois said that he did 
QRWEHOLHYHWRUWXUHZDVEHLQJDGYRFDWHG³EXWWKDWLIWKHFDPSDLJQPRYHGLWVIRFXVDZDy 
IURPWKH6FKRROLWZRXOGORVHLWVFDPSDLJQLQJIODJVKLS´120  Eric LeCompte, a member of 
62$:VWDIIDOVRVWDWHG³,EHOLHYHZHZLOOFORVHWKHVFKRROEXW,KRSHLWZRQ¶WEHWRRVRRQ
so that we can build a movement to make the connections with foreign policy´121  Many 
SOAW members continue to believe that WHINSEC is no different from SOA, and that it 
FRQWLQXHVWRSRVHDWKUHDWWRKXPDQULJKWVGHVSLWHWKHDFNQRZOHGJHPHQWDPRQJ62$:¶V
leadership that this is not the case.  Conveniently for the DoD, attention remains on 
WHINSEC, diverting attention from the majority of US military training.   
  
The US offers military training to states with poor human rights records, and the US itself 
has a poor human rights record.  The majority of US military training, both for domestic 
and foreign personnel, is devoid of any credible human rights content.  The current US 
administration is circumventing international law by sanctioning the repression of detainees 
LQWKH³:DURQ7HUURU´7KHVHSROLFLHVXQGHUPLQHWKHSURJUHVVPDGHDW:+,16(&ZKLFK
represents just one percent of all US training of foreign military personnel.  Rather than 
close WHINSEC, pressure should be put on the DoD to ensure that it remains transparent, 
and at the very least, that all other US military training initiatives are subject to the same 
level of external oversight.  Those in receipt of training, whether US nationals or 
foreigners, should receive the same levels of human rights training as WHINSEC students.  
SOAW could focus on these issues, as well as on the question of whether the human rights 
training provided is effective.  In addition, the administration should be challenged over its 
repressive practices iQWKH³:DURQ7HUURU´HVSHFLDOO\DVVXFKSUDFWLFHVDUHOLNHO\WR
influence US training of military forces from the South.  
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